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Abstract 
Better methods to detect insider threats need new anticipatory analytics to capture risky behavior prior 
to losing data. In search of the best overall classifier, this work empirically scores 88 machine learning 
algorithms in 16 major families. We extract risk features from the large CERT dataset, which blends real 
network behavior with individual threat narratives. We discover the predictive importance of measuring 
employee sentiment. Among major classifier families tested on CERT, the random forest algorithms offer 
the best choice, with different implementations scoring over 98% accurate. In contrast to more obscure 
or black-box alternatives, random forests are ensembles of many decision trees and thus offer a deep but 
human-readable set of detection rules (>2000 rules). We address performance rankings by penalizing long 
execution times against higher median accuracies using cross-fold validation. We address the relative 
rarity of threats as a case of low signal-to-noise (< 0.02% malicious to benign activities), and then train on 
both under-sampled and over-sampled data which is statistically balanced to identify nefarious actors. 
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Introduction 
Industry surveys asking “What do you consider the greatest security threat to your organization?” have 
shown that 77% of respondents topped their list with their own employee’s actions (either careless [60%] 
or disgruntled [17%] ones) (Dark Reading, 2014). However detection of trusted individuals with authorized 
credentials doing malicious things has been classified as one of the hardest cybersecurity problems 
(Hunker, et al, 2010) (and second only to nation-state cyberattack attributions, see Noever, et al., 2016).  
Therefore one motivation for this work is a growing realization that insider threat detection is neither 
looking at the right risk indicators nor applying state-of-the-art algorithms with common scoring metrics 
(Greitzer, et al. 2010).  
 
We apply novel feature engineering, 
automatically score each factor’s 
relevance and then test the 
classification success using a large 
machine learning suite of 88 algorithms 
in 16 major classifier families. A rough 
guide to which classifiers best apply in 
shown in Figure 1 based on problem 
features, sample number and whether 
an explainable reasoning requirement 
is needed. The last step follows similar 
comprehensive surveys by Caruna, et 
al. (2006) and Fernández-Delgado, et al. 
(2014); the latter particularly compared 
many learning algorithms (179) across 
diverse datasets (121). We specialize these algorithms to insider threat detection and identify particular 
weak and strong performers for both classifier families and their key predictive features.  The previous 
work by Caruna, et al. (2006) tested 8 model families (including 2000 variations of tuning parameters) 
Figure 1 Rough Guide to Choosing the Best Machine Learning Families 
against 7 binary classification problems (mainly medical) and found boosted decision trees as the best 
overall classifier. They also found good performance overall for neural nets, support vector machines, and 
bagged trees, depending on the scoring metric. Fernández-Delgado, et al. (2014) expanded this survey of 
best algorithms to 179 classifiers in 17 families against 121 datasets, the entire UCI machine learning data 
repository. They also found random forests as the most successful one overall. Finally massive online 
competitions such as Kaggle have attracted thousands of data scientists to apply their favorite algorithms 
and independently score them against industry-relevant problems. Three key anecdotal results from 
Kaggle (Goldbloom, 2015) emphasize the power of combining multiple algorithms, good feature 
engineering, and the general success of ensembles of decision trees (particularly random forests and 
extreme gradient boosting). In contrast to black-box alternatives with obscure interpretative rules, 
random forests are ensembles of many decision trees and thus offer a deep but human-readable set of 
detection rules. Such explainable artificial intelligence is recognized as a growing need and the subject of 
intense investigations particularly in high-stakes decision realms like medicine, defense, and human 
resources. 
 
Methods 
The Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute’s CERT Program’s Insider Threat database 
provides the largest public repository of red team scenarios. The simulation derives veracity from blending 
real-world insider threat case studies with actual benign users sampled anonymously from a defense 
corporation. The terabyte-sized data set describes 18 months of observing traffic from web, email, logon, 
file and device access (Table 1) in a single engineering company (dtaa.com). The mock company employs 
between 1000 and 4000 people who each perform an average 1000 logged activities per day. We address 
the top three of five total threat scenarios (leaker, thief, saboteur excluding data hoarders and laid-off 
Dropbox cases).  The data set comprises 209 million raw data points and 32 million time-stamped actions.  
The social connections between paired (to/from) users offer a half-million unique connections among just 
the top 3% of email exchanges. A notable feature of the problem is its very low signal-to-noise whether 
measured in total malicious users, daily tallies, or total usage: 0.2% of users (99.8% users benign); 0.08% 
of user-days (99.92% daily usage benign); 0.02% of user-actions (99.98% total usage benign). 
Table 1 CERT Dataset Activity, Features and Scale 
Activity Number Feature Count Features Description 
Website 28,434,423 6 id,date,user,pc,url,content 
Email 2,629,980 11 id,date,user,pc,to,cc,bcc,from,size,attachments,content 
Logon 854,860 5 id,date,user,pc,activity [logon/off] 
Files 445,581 6 id,date,user,pc,filename,content 
Device 405,380 5 id,date,user,pc,activity [connect/disconnect] 
 
In additions to activity logs, we augment the CERT dataset with other transformation metrics and outside 
supplemental sources. An example data transformation is to pair employee-supervisor roles as a factor. 
Examples of supplemental data include employee salary by job title, gender by first name, web categories 
by blacklists. To fill in features derived from the original CERT usage logs, Table 2 shows our novel data 
augmenting sources. 
Table 2 Data Augmentation Strategy and Choices for Predictive Feature Extraction 
Feature Benefit Source 
Employee-Supervisor Network Role Evolves over Time Calculated as Network Pairs 
Web Domain Type Categorical Assignments URLBlacklist.com 
Gender by First Name Behavioral/ Contextual Social Security Historical 
Salary by Job Title  National Averages Indeed.com 
Sentiment Analysis Email/File/Web Gradations AFINN-111 
Date Manipulations Day of Week, Hour of Day Calculated 
Statistical Features Change of life patterns Calculated 
Outlier Features Change of life patterns Calculated 
Log file Parsers Summations, Event Memory Calculated 
Human Resource Analytics Behavioral/ Contextual Calculated 
 
 
 
Dataset Preprocessing and Feature Extraction 
This analysis centered on one CERT Insider Threat scenario (v.4.2) specifically because it represents the 
only ‘dense needle’ dataset. Among the 6 total threat scenarios otherwise featuring low threat counts or 
‘needle in a haystack’ problems, scenario v.4.2 includes approximately 7% of the 1000 employees as 
nefarious for at least 1 of 18 month of logging. The alternative CERT scenarios follow similar threat 
narratives but provide just single cases for each insider class (thief, saboteur and leaker). However even 
this denser 4.2 scenario underscores the unbalanced nature of insider threat datasets generally, even with 
its 93% benign activity rates (see Lindauer, et al. 2014). Therefore we balanced the classification problem 
with statistical under-sampling of benign behavior and over-sampling of nefarious behavior. Because CERT 
reports critical job events such as employee departures as monthly changes, we extracted features from 
web, email, file and device logs across a similar monthly window.  We calculate monthly risk factors to 
summarize indicators for insider threat detection. Notably risky examples included incident counts for any 
outliers working outside normal hours and weekends.  
Table 3 Predictive Risk Indicators Extracted as CERT Features 
Risk Indicator Description 
risk_leak Leak risk calculated as event counts for email or web logs to file sharing domains 
dow_leak Day of week (weekend) count for leak risks 
hr_leak Off-hour (outside 8 AM to 5 PM) count for leak risks 
risk_thief Theft risk calculated as event counts for email or web logs to job search or competitor 
domains 
dow_thief Day of week (weekend) count for theft risks 
hr_thief Off-hour (outside 8 AM to 5 PM) count for theft risks 
risk_sabotage Sabotage risk calculated as event counts for web logs to malware or keylogger domains 
dow_sabotage Day of week (weekend) count for sabotage risks 
hr_sabotage Off-hour (outside 8 AM to 5 PM) count for sabotage risks 
device_freq Monthly device frequency (e.g. USB usage) 
file_freq Monthly file frequency (e.g. Word, PDF) 
email_sentiment Calculated monthly sentiment (polarity as positive or negative) in email text 
email_compete Calculated monthly count of emails to competitors 
web_sentiment Calculated monthly sentiment (polarity as positive or negative) in visited website text 
executables Calculated monthly file access to executables 
unauthorized_log Unauthorized device usage after employee departure 
gender Inferred employee gender from first name 
 
As shown in Table 3, we tabulated these threat features for each employee, along with their monthly class 
as: benign, departed, leaker, thief or saboteur. A single employee can reside in more than one class, since 
all begin as benign. For a baseline 1000 employees over 18 months, the maximum sample therefore 
reduces to 18,000 training cases.  Other than benign employees (80%) and former (departed) employees 
(13%), the nefarious cases are distributed by employee count as thieves (3%), leakers (3%) and saboteurs 
(1%).  From the larger universe of features that are domain-specific such as activities outside normal work 
hours, the highlighted features were visualized as statistical anomalies from pre-threat behavior. As 
shown in Figure 2, a box-whisker chart shows some of the more interesting class attributes compared to 
the company as a whole.  For the leaker and saboteur classes, other risky indicators combined with 
weekend or after-hours access can guide a potentially successful class partition. Distinguishing the thief 
class however proves more challenging, given that as part of their daily routines, the benign users also 
typically email competitors, visit job sites and access networks outside normal hours.   
 
We analyze sentiment factors in email, website content and accessed file text in a multistep process. We 
account for single word stems by removing numbers, stripping punctuation and lower-casing the text. For 
English sentiment, we employ the AFINN-111 (Nielsen, 2011) list of single words or phrases (2477) labelled 
on an integer (1-5) scale for positive or negative polarity. Examples of strong negative sentiment include 
most curse words, racial or class epithets and grievances (e.g. “tortures”). Examples of strong positive 
sentiment include broad approvals (e.g. “breakthrough” or “outstanding”). 
 
 
Figure 2 Box-Whisker Chart Highlights the Risk Distribution across Behavioral Classes 
 
Description of Feature Selection 
We applied automated feature selection to rank order each factor’s importance to identify each class.  
The approach assigns a top-down search based on Boruta as in Miron, et al. (2010). The approach 
systematically removes each factor and finds the loss of information in the final prediction. This algorithm 
confirms that each factor is statistically predictive and that none can be rejected as unimportant. 
Interestingly in the CERT data, inferred gender is relevant but the least predictive among the 17 features. 
Consistent with the previous findings shown in Figure 2, the least important factors in Figure 3 are also 
not the commonly logged activity frequencies such as access to executables, files and devices. This 
suggests that looking for employee-specific changes in these frequencies may not classify CERT 
abnormalities following the simpler workplace rules like banning USB devices or restricting executables.  
The broad feature contribution 
of employee sentiment in email 
and visited websites suggests a 
data pre-processing step might 
outperform single-factor 
business rules for designing or 
deploying new risk indicators. It 
is worth noting that CERT 
generously provides text for all 
employee visited websites 
which presents considerable 
practical challenges to archive 
and track continuously for even 
moderately sized enterprises. 
CERT may have provided this 
website text to guide 
researchers to create their own 
domain blacklists, which now 
routinely ship as updated, 
community supplements with 
all modern security software.  
As described in Table 2, we used 
the 4 million community-categorized domains from URLBlacklist.com.  Such website domain and 
categorization lists help to identify risky sites for employee interactions with competitors, webmail, file 
sharing, malware, and job searches. It is worth noting however that most benign employee actions also 
routinely access these domains (particularly webmail, competitors and job searches) and thus caution is 
needed if expecting them to be predictive (as enforced by company policies or standalone detection 
rules). 
 
 
Description of Classifier Suite 
Following data pre-processing and feature extraction, we undertook a survey of the machine learning 
landscape for handling a five-class partition (benign, departed, thief, leaker and saboteur). The monthly 
data was anonymized by employee id, such that each instance represents a one-shot prediction with no 
knowledge of employee id or their previous cumulative behavior.  For the unbalanced 18,000 training 
instances, the over-sampled set magnified the nefarious actors to provide equal distributions (78,446) for 
each class without distorting the statistical properties of input features. Similarly the under-sampled set 
reduced the benign actors to similarly provide only 10 cases each (50 total) but with representative input 
properties. The motivation for this statistical treatment stems partly from unbalanced training where 
algorithms converge prematurely to predict all employees act benignly (low true negatives). In practice, 
however, most currently deployed threat algorithms compound this bias by over-tuning their risk 
Figure 3 Rank Order of Predictive Information Embedded by Each Risk Feature 
indicators and thus yield very high false positives and unjustifiably flag benign employees. CERT (2017) 
concludes “many insider threat detection tools produce so many false positives that the tools are 
unusable.” A common user complaint about security software thus centers on the need either to chase 
down employees who pose no threat or to ignore the indicators altogether in favor of administrative 
intuition and judgement. 
 
We implemented the large-scale classifier suite using the R algorithm libraries conveniently packaged in 
a wrapper library called caret. This machine learning wrapper described by (Kuhn, 2008) provides a 
common calling function, train, which simplifies such large scale algorithm surveys. Currently caret 
supports 179 algorithms as classifiers.  For insider threat detection, our final machine learning suite 
included 88 algorithms in 16 major classifier families for performing regression (linear or logistic 
multinomial, adaptive spline, partial least squares, polynomial); Bayesian; neural networks including deep 
and shallow layers; support vector machines; rule-based decision trees including ensembles such as 
boosting, bagging, stacking and random forests. We ranked the algorithms on two often competing axes: 
median predictive accuracy and relative execution time. Since execution time is machine-dependent, 
relative ranking and log rescaling between 0-1 proved the most useful time metric.  We validated 
performance by partitioning training and testing data, along with repeated cross-fold validation in both 
the under-sampled and over-sampled cases. We attempted no parameter tuning in favor of accepting 
model defaults. Models were excluded if they took longer than a few hours or failed to converge, a 
compromise which accounted for about half the attrition from the original list of 179 algorithms. 
 
Results 
Figures 4 and 5 summarize the classifiers ranked from best to worst for the over-sampled and under-
sampled training sets respectively. Among major classifier families, the best raw scores derive from the 
random forest algorithms, with different implementations scoring over 98% accurate in the over-sampled 
dataset with 78,446 cases and 94% accurate in the under-sampled dataset with 50 cases. As a general out-
performing algorithm, the success of random forests mirrors the previous findings in large-scale surveys 
and international data competitions like Kaggle. 
 
To emphasize the potential tradeoff between execution speed and accuracy, we rescaled the relative time 
using log(time)/max(log(time) and plotted the Accuracy vs. Time scatter to visualize the faster and more 
accurate algorithms in Figure 6. with classifier family color-coded.  For instance the upper left quadrant 
represents one view of the faster, better family of choices and the lower right corresponds to slower, 
poorer choices. In practice, the classifier choice may also depend on data size, noise and need for 
continuous vs. batch training.   
 
For the better performing random forest family, Figure 7 shows an error- or confusion-matrix for each 
insider threat cases where actual vs. predicted threats fall into the four quadrants (e.g. true/ false 
positive/negative cases). All the classes show false assignments (red quadrant) in less than 1% of the cases.  
Consistent with the original box-whisker charts in Figure 2, predicting the thief’s behavior presents the 
biggest challenge as the thief’s activities resemble those of benign employees but even in this more 
overlapping class, the best algorithms can still classify them with 1.1% false assignment rates.  
 
 Figure 4 Over-sampled Results by Model Accuracy and Time 
As a proxy simple rule-based 
detectors, the closest listed 
comparison is the recursive partition 
(or RPART) algorithm which achieves 
78% (over-sampled) and 38% (under-
sampled) accuracy rates. This 
industry-standard approach is a multi-
branch “if/then” decision tree. Its 
deployment is partly motivated by its 
ease of interpretation and user 
modifications particularly when 
implemented as single-depth trees (no 
branching for other factors). However 
for complex, multi-featured datasets 
such as insider threats, the tendency 
for simple decision trees to overfit 
training data and predict poorly leads 
to high false-positive rates. Simple 
rule-based detectors lag even further 
when scoring the typically unbalanced 
training data that threat prediction 
demands post-deployment. A best 
case of rules-based classifiers 
achieving 20% error rates while evaluating a 1000-person company would present a practical challenge 
to its cybersecurity team.   
 
Figure 5 Under-sampled Results by Model Accuracy and Time 
  
Figure 6 Algorithm accuracy as a function of execution times 
 
 
Figure 7 Error or confusion matrices for insider threat classes. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
A surprising result is the broad success found here applying random forests to detect insider threats.  
Other authors have employed random forests for detecting anomalous behavior but only for particular 
subsets of online activity in games like World of Warcraft, social media or modeled datasets from other 
realms (Brdiczka, et al, 2012; Gavai, et al. 2015; Emmott, et al. 2015). To our knowledge, none has applied 
systematic algorithmic scoring to the CERT dataset, or included rankings of new features by their 
predictive importance. A number of commercial tools deploy rule-based, online monitoring but do not 
provide guidance on their ability to generalize or learn, or their objective scoring against some ground 
truth. 
 
A data-driven challenge to single-rule detectors:  The present approach relies on collecting both accepted 
and novel metrics or predictive risk indicators (PRIs) but differs in its independence from peer-group 
observation or simple rule-based detection.  One way to compare these machine learning results to 
existing rule-based security systems is to take an industry (Deloitte) list of top 25 predictive risk indicators 
(PRI) and score them against the CERT dataset. Many of the PRIs in Table 4 highlight compliance violations, 
which in many cases can be eluded by a cautious insider or routinely flouted by unknowing but benign 
users. For illustration, we rank order the 18,000 user-months by each PRI and assume that even an 
ambitious IT staff can track only the top 100 cases over time.  We focus on 6 of the 25 PRIs that involve 
CERT-available network logs, including file, malware, and device activity along with emailing competitors 
and web sentiment (as a proxy for social media anomalies). All 6 network PRIs lead to extremely high false 
positives (84-100%) and low true negatives (0-23%). One reason for this failure may derive from CERT 
blending real network usage with threat narratives and the low signal-to-noise in real-world detection. 
Another reason may follow from individual behavioral changes dominating the deviations from the 
enterprise mean. A final reason may stem from not including the critical threat triggering event, usually a 
work termination or dispute which dramatically alters the importance of a given factor (e.g. collecting 
many files after a grievance). The IT challenge however remains when building risk dashboards, for 
instance, if they show the daily top 100 risky employees and then task the IT staff to discover the root 
causes. What may look like poor employee behavior may arise more clearly as just poor metrics and 
underperforming algorithms. 
 
The often cited answer to these challenges is to encourage employee self-patrols, a policy of encouraging 
internal amateur profiling. This approach requires a lot of sophistication and may arise more as a 
recognition of the data-mining challenges than a reliable threat detector.  For example false positives arise 
routinely from employees who are sick, change job roles or cope with unknown outside challenges 
(medical, etc.).  Costly false negatives can also arise from organizations that advertise detection criteria 
to the often clever thief in the hopes that co-workers can sift through the subtle or hidden changes in co-
workers’ abnormal weekend events, after-hour access, and the explosion of compliant but malicious 
copying strategies (phones, cameras, and multimedia). 
 
This low success rate from applying business rules follows what FBI guidance has previously found, namely 
that only 5% of its 65 espionage cases were correctly flagged as potential bad actors and their first 
predictive models did worse than random (Ready, 2013). A key reason cited was unbalanced datasets with 
an excess of noisy (but benign) events and the lack of true positives to train detectors on rare or “Black 
Swan” events. A further qualification was that outliers must arise from individual patterns of activity and 
not deviations from average enterprise monitoring. This focus on individual deviations is akin to 
distinguishing a normal anomaly from an abnormal one. Ready suggests five broad insider threat 
approaches: 1) assume employees don’t behave like outside hackers; 2) assume the threat is not a 
technical issue alone or a particularly good candidate for intrusion and antivirus monitors; 3) limit the data 
overload inherent in the normal, benign behavior; 4) educate the workforce to focus on deterrence and 
crowd-sourcing detection; and 5) use behavioral analytics to prioritize risky changes in an individual’s 
pattern of life.  The latter issue was examined here to assess the effectiveness of reducing false positives 
and predicting data theft or leakage and IT sabotage.   
 
Table 4 Top 25 Industry Risk Indicators and Accuracy as Single Rules against CERT Data 
Predictive Risk Indicator False 
Accusations 
Eludes 
Detection 
Metric 
Collection of large quantities of files 100% 100% File Frequency 
Antivirus/malware alerts 100% 100% Risk Sabotage 
Excessively large downloads     N/A 
Access request denials 84% 77% Unauthorized 
Logons 
Large outbound e-mail traffic volume     N/A 
Emails with attachments sent to suspicious recipients 100% 100% Email 
Competitors 
Transmittal device (e.g. printers, copiers, fax machine) 
anomalies 
    N/A 
Removable media alerts and anomalies 99% 98% Device Frequency 
Access levels     N/A 
Security clearance     N/A 
Privilege user rights     N/A 
Physical access request denials     N/A 
Physical access anomalies     N/A 
Audit remediation progress     N/A 
Non-compliance with training requirements     N/A 
Organizational policy violation (e.g. data classification 
policy, avoiding an e-QIP) 
    N/A 
Expense violations     N/A 
Time entry violations     N/A 
Declining performance ratings     N/A 
Notice of resignation or termination     N/A 
Reprimand or warning     N/A 
Social media anomalies 100% 100% Web Sentiment 
Financial stressors     N/A 
Criminal and Civil History Background Checks     N/A 
Foreign contacts/travel     N/A 
 
 
The potential for better natural language processors:  Given the apparent predictive power of sentiment 
analysis, it is worth mentioning that in the interest of processing speed, we scored only the simplest 
polarities. Many alternative dictionaries can be compared, along with more contextual multi-word (or n-
grams), but the initial choice here was to provide the cumulative monthly sentiment total for each 
employee. A fuller survey of machine learning methods for natural language scoring would add many 
more dimensions to ranking these classifiers but one might incorporate the best methods in a two-stage 
classifier that first extracts sentiment features, then predicts the employee classification. The challenge 
to that approach however is that lack of a pre-labelled training and testing set for sentiment scores that 
might guide the a best selection criterion. 
 
The potential for unsupervised learning methods: A commonly cited hindrance to building better insider 
detectors is the lack of more training datasets that are pre-labeled with threat classes (see Emmott, et al, 
2013).  One result found here related to this challenge is that a few good algorithms can learn from 
unlabeled threat data. For such unsupervised learning, network traffic for individuals are clustered by 
activity types without manual labels or pre-built threat narratives. The advantages of unsupervised 
learning derive from automated clustering in high-dimensional problem spaces.  Unsupervised learning 
also can remove the cumbersome and often inaccurate data generating steps for labelling and updating 
to evolving threats.  In this regard, two algorithm families (k-Nearest Neighbors and Stacked Auto-encoder 
Deep Neural Networks) deserve particular mention in our classifier rankings, since they can potentially 
operate unsupervised without knowing an employee’s threat rating. While deep neural nets offer great 
promise in other application fields for classifying large image or audio datasets, one surprising result is 
they generally fail against the CERT data. Deep neural nets perform poorly in the bottom 10% of 
algorithms, perhaps because of the unscaled input ranging approximately from 0-1000.  Tuor, et al. (2017) 
recently reported promising 95.53% anomaly detection using many deep nets trained individually for each 
user in CERT v.6.2.  For nearest neighbors, however, its clustering performs well for this multi-class 
problem (scoring in the top 10% both in speed and accuracy). It deserves further investigation as an 
unsupervised learning candidate for accommodating new, previously unseen threats and finding probable 
threat types. Future work will apply k-nearest neighbors for labeling. A next step for exploiting the success 
of a fully-trained random forest can focus on reducing these multi-featured decision trees to a high-speed 
“if/then” filtering algorithm and SQL-like queries to run against real-time online activities. 
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